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cess is to develop a competency-based   The following section highlights the in-  occurred prior and after Public Law 111-
        program that will attend to academic   vestigative process and outcomes for the   216 have suggested that flight hours are
        and regulatory requirements and that   selected accidents.                not a good predictor of pilot’s perfor-
        are in alignment with the major aviation                                  mance.
        stakeholders’ standards and recommen-  Pilot Competencies and Aviation      In another example, an Airbus A300-
        dations. It is important to note that a                                   600, operating as UPS Flight 1354,
        competency-based degree will require   Safety                             crashed short in August 2013 during a
        graduates to demonstrate proficiency in   The global aviation industry is moving   nonprecision approach to Runway 18 at
        competencies that are valued by the avi-  toward EBT and rigorous assessment   Birmingham-Shuttlesworth Internation-
        ation and aerospace industries. There-  and assurance of pilot competencies   al Airport in Birmingham, Alabama. The
        fore, this will be beneficial for both the   throughout their training, regardless   aircraft was damaged beyond repair by
        graduates as well as the industry.   of the accumulated flight hours. The   impact forces and a postcrash fire. Both
                                             aim of the EBT program is to identify,   flightcrew members were killed as a re-
                                             develop, and evaluate the competencies   sult. The board highlighted several issues
        Aircraft Accident Investigation      required to operate safely, effectively, and   associated with poor decision-making
        Process                              efficiently in a commercial air transport   and communication processes by the
        Human errors have been implicated in   environment while addressing the most   flightcrew members and inadequate
        more than 80% of aircraft accidents.   relevant threats according to evidence   leadership by the captain. The final
        However, those errors should be viewed   collected in aircraft mishaps, flight oper-  report indicated several safety recom-
        from a systemic perspective since ex-  ations, and training.              mendations in which some called for
        pressions such as procedural violations,   In 2009, Colgan Air Flight 3407, a   improved communication processes by
        human errors, and/or poor CRM will   Bombardier DHC-8-400, crashed dur-   flight crews.
        have limited value in preventing future   ing an instrument approach to Buffalo   The FAA has mandated CRM for Part
        mishaps. Latent conditions arising   Niagara International Airport in Buffalo,   121 operators since 1998. The CRM
        in the managerial and organizational   New York, killing two pilots, two flight at-  training provided by air carriers general-
        sectors frequently facilitates a breach (or   tendants, 45 passengers, and a person on   ly includes concepts such as leadership,
        breaches) of the complex aviation sys-  the ground. The NTSB identified several   communication, decision-making, and
        tem’s inherent safety defenses. In simpler   issues associated with the pilots’ deci-  threat-and-error management. CRM
        terms, latent conditions often permit or   sion-making, teamwork, and communi-  training has enhanced aviation safety
        even motivate unsafe acts by the flight   cation processes. The report emphasized   and efficiency. Nevertheless, aircraft
        crew (and other aviation professionals).   poor leadership by the captain as a fac-  accidents and incidents in which inad-
          According to ICAO, the accident    tor in this mishap. The board members   equate CRM processes are identified as
        investigation process is comprised of   suggested that leadership training for   contributing factors still occur. There
        three phases: data collection, data anal-  upgrading captains could both standard-  is no empirical evidence to support the
        ysis, and presentation of findings. The   ize and reinforce the leadership com-  claim that more flight hours will make
        data collection process should focus on   petency of a pilot-in-command during   a pilot safer and/or more efficient. For
        obtaining data relevant to the accident,   air carrier operations. Lastly, the board   example, the captain and the first officer
        which will include human factors. The   issued two safety recommendations cov-  of Colgan Air Flight 3407 had 3,379 and
        data analysis should be concurrently   ering leadership training for upgrading   2,244 total flying time, respectively.
        conducted with the data collection   captains at 14 Code of Federal Regula-  Similarly, the captain and the first officer
        process. The analysis of data frequently   tions Part 91K, 121, and 135 operators.  of UPS Flight 1354 had 6,406 and 4,721
        triggers additional needs that require   The Colgan accident became a major   flight hours, respectively.
        further data collection. During those two   catalyst of significant changes in the U.S.   Aircraft design and reliability as well
        phases investigators should scrutinize   aviation industry, mostly focusing on   as flight education and training have
        whether errors and/or violations by   flight crew training and qualifications.   steadily and significantly improved in
        the pilots suggest deficiencies in nec-  The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation   the last 20 years. Nevertheless, high-pro-
        essary knowledge, abilities, and skills   Administration Extension Act (Public   file accidents still occur, even when the
        for efficient and safe job performance.   Law 111-216), passed in 2010, requires   aircraft and related systems are operat-
        Moreover, investigators should assess if   pilots to hold an airline transport pilot   ing adequately along with experienced
        identified flaws in pilot competencies   (ATP) certificate in order to be hired by   pilots. For instance, controlled flight into
        result from training inadequacies.   a U.S. air carrier. In order to possess an   terrain, runway incursions, and loss of
          When the active failures and latent   ATP certificate, pilots must be 23 years   control in flight are mishaps in which
        conditions have been identified, the   old and have at least 1,500 flight hours.   inadequate decision-making, poor lead-
        safety investigators should elaborate   This rule, however, allows some age   ership and/or teamwork, and ineffective
        safety recommendations to prevent the   and flight-hour reductions for specific   communication processes are frequently
        reoccurrence of similar accidents. It is   military and FAA-approved post-sec-  cited as contributing factors. Interest-
        important to note that safety recom-  ondary academic experiences. Currently,   ingly, pilots involved in the mentioned
        mendations will generally address any   this law has created major challenges   accidents were arguably experienced.
        possible combination of three factors:   for airlines to find and hire qualified   Conversely, the investigation of acci-
        training, technology, and regulations.   pilots. Notwithstanding, accidents that   dents, for example, US Airways Flight

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