Page 18 - Forum-2020-JulyToSeptember

and subjective usability during prevented the hazard from united in trying to accomplish recoveries. The targeted focus
various operational tasks. Usu- resulting in a mishap. Using a common goal is to reinforce group participants were pilots
ally, these tasks and scenarios this database, successful miti- that every time a hazard is and maintainers who had just
are designed to verify specific gations can be tracked. A major reported using this system it returned from a deployment.
aspects of the user interface strength of the program is that is an opportunity to intervene During these interviews, we
for compliance with standards it provides an avenue to solicit in a condition that had the learned the importance of
while simultaneously providing field knowledge, circumstanc- potential to result in a mishap. team composition and the
feedback, which helps im- es, and expert opinions on a Therefore, by reporting hazards desired skill level of pilots. One
prove the HMI to meet future recommended path forward personnel are ensuring a safe of the major topics of discus-
operational needs and expand for operational concerns. work environment for them- sion was the gap between the
system capabilities. There have been numerous selves, as well as contributing idealized (and trained) aircraft
Limitations of the workload instances of maintenance to an overall organizational recovery schema versus how
analysis are due to sample errors and near-miss reports mission of reducing the mishap the UAS pilots were expected
size, and evaluations thus far being used to create system rate. to interact with airspace and
having been conducted during and procedural change at Insi- other aviators. Based on the
simulated flight. While there tu. Through use of the Focus Groups/User Inter- information provided, changes
are benefits to conducting HAZREP program, these were made to the software that
the evaluations in a simulated errors, near-misses, and pre- views allows for greater manipula-
environment (the main benefit vention ideas are evaluated, As a part of failure review tion of the approach corridor
being elimination of mishap tracked, and implemented. boards spurred by clusters and allows the air vehicle to
risk due to divided attention), For example, the Hazard of a specific type of failure, perform more similarly to
the simulated environment Review Board received mul- focus groups and user in- manned aircraft in controlled
does not perfectly mirror the tiple HAZREPs documenting terviews have been used to airspace. With this expanded
stresses of a live flight or mis- the hazard of not being able obtain information from pilots functionality, there was also
sion scenario. to communicate between the and operational personnel. the suggestion for expanded
As a result of the workload ground crew and the ground The best recommendations training to improve the pilots’
and usability assessments, we control system at a site. There and discussion thus far have ability and comfort in operat-
have received both qualitative was concern that the inability developed out of using a focus ing alongside manned aircraft.
and quantitative feedback from to communicate would cause group–type session in which
operational personnel that has an inadvertent launch or could questions are posed to groups Mishap Investigation/Reac-
been translated into actionable result in personnel injury. As a of operational personnel rather
recommendations for software result of the hazard review pro- than one-on-one interviews. tive Mishap Prevention
development. cess, a new radio system with Using a focus group as a forum, While it is still early in the
headsets for the ground crew insight is obtained from mul- development and imple-
mentation of these proactive
tiple operational sites at once,
HFACS for Near-Miss/Hazard was implemented at the site. and comparison and con- initiatives, the process to track
Currently, the most prevalent
Reporting condition reported using the trast of the challenges under and complete recommen-
Insitu has a robust near-miss/ hazard identification program different conditions is easily dations stemming from the
hazard reporting system that is the identification of proce- obtained. While a standard list investigation of mishaps is
receives hazard reports dural guidance or publications of questions is usually followed, well established. Investigations
(HAZREPs) from multiple that create an unsafe situa- when open discussion be- are conducted for all mishaps
different sources. These tion. This type of hazard is tween operational personnel is reported to the Insitu Aviation
HAZREPs are categorized, commonly identified by either facilitated it has been possible Safety Department that meet
triaged, and dispositioned at deployed personnel or the to identify similarities (as well a defined criteria. During the
a formal review board. During Training Department. One of as differences) between the investigations, all evidence
the triage and review process, the most challenging aspects of failures and challenges occur- that was received is reviewed.
the identified hazards are managing the hazard report- ring at different operational This evidence is analyzed for
screened for elements related ing program is encouraging locations or using different material, environmental, and
to human factors and/or hu- the reporting of problems or product configurations. This human-related failures. Assign-
man error. If there is a human deficiencies without creating information has been invalua- ment of a single type (material,
component to the identified an environment in which the ble for gathering information environmental, or human) of
hazard, HFACS is used to tag team responsible for fixing the on experience and training of failure is often not possible, as
and categorize the identified deficiency feels it is to “blame.” personnel, flight operations, the mishaps are due to a com-
hazard or near-miss. This is a fine balance and is and desired software improve- bination of conditions that all
The HAZREP program is contingent on the cultural ma- ments. aligned to create the circum-
beneficial in that we are able turity of the organization. One Most recently, multiple focus stances in which the mishap
to identify hazards before of the points that is empha- groups were conducted over a occurred. Therefore, the inves-
they result in mishaps; when sized to reinforce the positive period of several weeks to gath- tigator must determine the role
paired with HFACS, we are aspects of the program and er information on failures and and contribution of each type
able to identify which barriers ensure that the organization is challenges related to air vehicle of contributing factor.

18 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum