Page 19 - Forum-2020-JulyToSeptember

Figure 2: Relative frequency of HFACS codes assigned to mishap investigations.

At Insitu, since 2009 material mishaps attributed to human ing deployed locations. operate cooperatively, we need
failures have been identified as error are tracked and further One of the complex chal- to develop communication
the primary cause of mishaps categorized. Failure to follow lenges we identified and channels and inform air traffic
more prevalently than human checklists and procedures and anticipate for the future is the control and other users within
or environmental causes. inadequate risk assessment interaction between manned the area of operations on our
However, if Insitu follows a are the leading contributory and unmanned aircraft. performance capabilities and
similar path to manned avia- human factors in mishaps Changes will need to be made limitations.
tion, as aircraft become more attributed to human error. In to regulations, technology, As time progresses, we will
(mechanically) reliable, the addition, at the organizational training, and culture to pro- work to improve and mature
total number of mishaps will level, providing inadequate vide an environment in which these programs, building the
decrease, but the percentage procedural guidance and both manned aircraft and UAS fundamental structure of a
of mishaps caused by human publications to sites has been coexist safely and successfully. safety management system.
factors will increase. identified as a contributing fac- As regulations are currently One of the greatest challenges
To aid in the investigation, tor to many mishaps attributed under development across the is the process to bridge the gap
HFACS is utilized to categorize to human error. globe, we are using feedback effectively and efficiently be-
casual and/or contributory from controlled encounters to tween operational personnel
conditions that were identified. predict and proactively address and design activities. To be ef-
The purpose of the identi- Conclusion some of the potential operation- fective, the process to take the
fication and categorization As a result of the findings from al challenges. For example, UAS feedback and lessons learned
of these factors is to identify mishap investigations and pilots come from a variety of and efficiently distribute this
trends and also to guide the the proactive mishap pre- backgrounds and may not have knowledge back to areas that
development of recommenda- vention programs previously experience in manned aviation. can execute change should
tions and mitigations. This in- described, recommendations To decrease risk and increase be scheduled, solidified, and
formation is stored within the are developed and distributed the probability of successful formalized.
database and queried monthly to accountable departments interactions, we are working on In looking to the prevention
to identify trends and push the throughout the company. These ways to develop the curriculum of future mishaps, the past is
latest information out to users recommendations have result- to increase the relative skill level anything but irrelevant;
and development groups. ed in changes to the design of of UAS pilots to make them not however, future safety lies not
In anticipation of the tran- the software, autopilot logic, simply operators but avia- only in correcting mistakes
sition from primarily ma- publication updates and chang- tors. In addition, the need for from the past and preventing
chine-related causes to human es, training curriculum develop- education is two-sided. As with reoccurrence, but also in the
error mishaps, the causal ment, and even improvements manned aviation, every aircraft anticipation of future chal-
and contributory factors for to the infrastructure surround- has operating limitations. To lenges and threats.

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 19