Page 25 - Forum-2020-JulyToSeptember

ness models and risk calculus are quite longer would be acceptable to the general need to be made as to what extent UAS
different from those of manned aircraft public. Identifying and implementing regulatory proposals will need to adapt to
manufacturers and operators, they tend credible preventive actions will be essen- conventional aviation rules, parameters,
to seek to avoid complying with any re- tial to restoring public confidence in regu- procedures, and practices. Considera-
quirements not explicitly for the safety of lators and minimizing overreactions that tion should be given to whether existing
the overarching aviation system and all of actually could harm the unmanned sector standards and regulations that govern the
its stakeholders. more than the laissez-faire approach has operation of manned aircraft can be lev-
Manned aircraft pilots are rational helped it. This is where lessons learned eraged, while also addressing the specific
actors; they have never been big fans of from past accidents involving manned and unique needs and characteristics of
dying. Aircraft manufacturers are rational aircraft will have to be relearned. UAS. When building a regulatory frame-
actors; they never have been interested in work for UAS, it is important to ensure
seeing large judgments against them for The Lessons of History that the new regulations do not contra-
unreliable designs that have led to losses. Since the aviation enterprise as a whole is dict existing aviation regulations.”
Commercial air carriers are rational notoriously slow to act on safety concerns If it is not possible to examine the
actors; they will not engage in operational until catastrophes force action, the air course of unmanned aviation’s growth in
behavior that is likely to place their pas- safety investigator community needs to the greater airspace system prior to an
sengers in jeopardy or even to make them be ready to highlight where UAS devel- accident, air safety investigators will need
uncomfortable in flight. opment and certification requirements to have done at least a little advanced
In unmanned aviation, risk decisions thinking about how to proceed. The ob-
are driven by different considerations, have diverged from those of manned jectives of the accident investigation pro-
aircraft. Past accident reports will need
and the priorities of the manufacturers to be dusted off and reexamined as “new” cess can be summarized in two straight-
and operators come from a significantly unmanned aircraft accidents, or those forward steps: identify causes and make
different direction. If one digs deeper, it where unmanned aircraft are involved, recommendations to prevent recurrence.
becomes clear that, from a regulatory occur in which long-standing adjust- Accidents involving unmanned aircraft—
perspective, there is a certain logic in ments have been made to rules governing especially where loss of life occurs—will
placing less of a burden—a “price of ad- manned aircraft. require two additional steps:
mission,” if you like—on RPAS operators For this approach to bear fruit, how- • Determine whether the sequence of
willing to accept a certain amount of loss ever, it is crucial to consider how those events might have been different had
in the course of their operations, as long manned aircraft accidents occurred, a manned aircraft been the subject of
as those operations do not pose a hazard the investigation.
to the general public or to other users of along with the specific changes made • Determine why any difference
common airspace. to aircraft, the regulatory environment, between manned and unmanned avi-
However, problems arise when lessons human-machine interfaces, and pilot ation requirements or rules identified
from the past that speak to current or training and certification that arose from in the sequence of events exists.
emerging hazards are not recognized as their investigations and recommenda- As observed above, it has been critical
such, and a hands-off regulatory ap- tions. The fundamentals—the nature of to accident investigations over time to
proach can result in minimally regulated known risks and the detailed sequence of identify instances in which the act of
operations interacting with those regu- events documented in similar previous flying itself has encountered unknown
lated on the basis of previously identified accidents—will be critical in such cases. hazards and the expansion of aviation
need. The present interest in enabling and Both regulators and the general public has created unrecognized hazards. In
encouraging the growth of unmanned often forget that many aviation-related the past, the governing principle was
aviation means RPAS are being regulated rules have been written in blood and de- “You don’t know what you don’t know.” In
with as light a touch as possible, often rived from accident investigation recom- future investigations involving UAS, it is
with the regulators taking on more risk mendations. In the aftermath of aircraft likely that at least some of the accident
on behalf of the public than would be accidents, air safety investigators often sequence will be uncomfortably familiar
considered acceptable for manned air- are obliged to consider both previous risk and the question to be answered might be
craft and operations. decisions and prior accident investiga- “Why didn’t we see this coming?”
While this pattern of benign ne- tions whose recommendations were not
glect may survive the first catastrophic acted upon. It would seem prudent to do
accident directly attributable to an likewise in consciously addressing the The Power of Analogy
unmanned aircraft, it will be unlikely to latitude accorded unmanned aircraft in While I prepared this paper, it became
survive a second. Public outcry for rapid, “growing the sector” before the pressures clear to me that it can be difficult to align
decisive, and effective action will then and passions of a new investigation come previous accidents and preventive actions
place national aviation authorities in the into play. involving manned aviation against the
difficult position of having to justify their ICAO’s UAS Toolkit offers a good start- unmanned sector. It would be a relatively
previous risk decisions (economic benefit ing point for discussions between air safe- simple matter to inquire into an accident
to the UAS sector versus risk to existing ty investigators and regulators: “States involving, say, an unmanned aircraft
stakeholder operations). will want to make key policy, technical, lacking required two-way communica-
More important, however, is the like- regulatory, and programing decisions tions and a transponder colliding with
lihood that the permissive status quo no for UAS operations. A determination will a properly equipped manned aircraft in
July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 25